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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPLIANCE,
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND ENTERPRISE
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE TRUMP/PENCE
ERA
Marcia Narine Weldon*
[F]here is one and only one sodal responsibility of business-to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of
the game, which is to say, engages in open andfree competition without deception and
fraud. -Milton Friedman, 1970'
INTRODUCTION
With Republicans controlling Congress, a Republican CEO as
President, a "czar" appointed to oversee deregulation,' and billionaires
leading key Cabinet posts, corporate America had reason for optimism
following President Trump's unexpected election in 2016. However, the
first year of the Trump Administration has not yielded the kinds of re-
sults that many business people had originally anticipated. Candidate
Trump promised an aggressive agenda of, among other things, disman-
*Lecturer in law at the University of Miami, former Deputy General Counsel, Vice
President of Global Conduct and Business Standards, and Chief Privacy Officer of a
Fortune 500 Company. I would like to thank Jaymar Bonet, Janna Mateo, Daniel Jo-
seph, Amal Uthman, and the organizers and participants of the Business Law. Connect-
ing the Threads Symposium at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
I Milton Friedman, A Fiedman doctrine-The Social Responsibikly of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126.
2 Carl Icahn, the President's advisor on deregulation, stepped down from his appoint-
ment in August 2017. See Tom DiChristopher & Everett Rosenfield, CarlIchan Resigned
from Trump Advisor Role Ahead ofArticle Alleging Confict of Interest, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2017),
www.cnbc.com/2017/08/20/carl-icahn-resigned-from-trump-advisor-role-ahead-of-
artide-alleging-conflict-of-interest.html; see also Joe Mont, Ichan Bids Adieu as Trump's
Unoffiaal Deregulation Guru, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.com-
plianceweek.com/blogs/the-fihing-cabinet/icahn-bids-adieu-as-trump/oE2%80%99s-
unofficial-deregulation-guru#.WbB-CJOGPFQ.
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ding Dodd-Frank, repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act,'
improving the nation's infrastructure, revamping trade deals, solving the
decades-old immigration dilemma, eliminating onerous laws, and lower-
ing the tax burden.'
Unfortunately, not only has this pro-business agenda stalled in
Congress, but the President has, in some instances, issued executive or-
ders 6 and proposed legislation' that completely contravenes much of
3 See Emily Flitter & Steve Holland, Trump Pnparing Plan to Dismantle Obama's Wall Street
Reform Law, REUTERS (May 17, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-election-trump-banks/trump-preparing-plan-to-dismantle-obamas-wall-street-
reform-law-idUSKCNOY900J; see generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,111th Cong. (2010).
4 See Caroline Humer, Trump Promised to Repeal Obamacare. Now What?, REUTERS (Nov.
10, 2016, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-obamacare-analy-
sis/trump-promised-to-repeal-obamacare-now-what-idUSKBN135171; see generaly H.R.
Doc. No. 111-1, 111th Cong. (2010).
5 See Pamela Engel, Trump's First 100 Days Were Un/ke An We've Ever Seen - Here Are
All the Promises He's Kept and Broken, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2017), http://
www.businessinsider.com/ trump-first-100-days-promises-2017-4.
6 See David Streitfeld et al., Silicon Valley's Ambivalence Toward Trump Turns to Anger N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/technology/silicon-
valleys-ambivalence-toward-trump-turns-to-anger.html?mcubz= 1&_r=0 (observing
reactions to an executive order temporarily barring immigrants from predominantly
Muslim countries). After repeated failures of the Republican-led Congress to repeal and
replace the Affordable Care Act, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Octo-
ber 12, 2017 asking federal agencies to determine ways to expand the use of association
health plans and to broaden the definition of short-term insurance, which is currently
exempt from the Affordable Care Act. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER PROMOTING HEALTHCARE CHOICE AND COMPETITION ACROSS
THE UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/
12/presidential-executive-order-promoting-healthcare-choice-and-competition. Many in
the business community voiced concerns about the stability of the insurance market
after this Order and the President's statements that he may end health care subsidies.
See also Dan Mangan, Obamacare Defenders Blast Trump's New Executive Order on Health Care
as More 'Sabotage', CNBC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/12
/obamacare-defenders-blast-trumps-new-executive-order-on-health-care-as-more-sabo-
tage.html (the American Academy of Actuaries observed, the order "could present sig-
nificant risks and have unintended consequences for consumers and health insurance
markets."). The Administration's new tax plan, which eliminates the individual mandate,
has also raised concerns. Robert Pear, Without the Insurance Mandate, Health Care's Future
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what his former business peers have advocated for over the years. In ad-
dition, dozens of CEOs have resigned from various presidential advisory
boards that would have provided the executives with the opportunity for
significant influence over policies that could positively affect their share-
holders, employees, and customers.' These resignations may raise corpo-
rate governance concerns because, in some cases, they had nothing to do
with purely commercial interests but more to do with public perception,
corporate social responsibility ("CSR"),' or the CEO's stated personal
ideologies.
May be in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18
/us/politics/tax-cut-obamacare-individual-mandate-repeal.html?_r=0
7 See Catherine Rampell, Our Business President Looks Prtty Anti-Business, WASHINGTON
POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/our-businessman-
president-looks-pretty-anti-business/2017/04/10/7452639c-le28-1 1e7-be2a3al fb24
d4671_story.html?utm_term=.4122a1078081.
See Jessica Estepa, Hispanic Chamber CEO Resigns from Trump's Diversity Council over
DACA Decision, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/onpolitics/2017/09/05/hispanic-chamber-commerce-ceo-resigns-diver-
sity-council-over-daca-decision/633219001/; Jena McGregor & Damian Paletta,
Trump's Business Advisory Council Disband as CEOs Abandon President Over Charlottestille,
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
leadership/wp/2017/08/16/after-wave-of-ceo-departures-trump-ends-business-and-
manufacturing-councils/?utmjterm= .39ae797910fe.
9 There is no one established definition for CSR. See, e.g., Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo,
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness, 59
MGMT. SCL 1045, [1046] ([May] 2013), http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/ms2013.pdf
(citing various definitions but adopting the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development's 2004 definition) . . . . The United States government has explained,
"[r]esponsible business conduct is intended to include a broad range of areas in which
corporate conduct impacts society. It is well understood that responsible business con-
duct (RBC), sometimes referred to as corporate social responsibility or CSR, entails
conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards. Based
on the idea that you can do well while doing no harm, RBC is a broad concept that
focuses on two aspects of the business-society relationship: 1) the positive contribution
businesses can make to economic, environmental, and social progress with a view to
achieving sustainable development, and 2) avoiding adverse impacts and addressing
them when they do occur." [U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, USG NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, Feb. 12, 2015,] https://www.state.gov/documents/ organiza-
tion/265918.pdf/; see also Marcia Naine, Disclosing Disclosure's Defects: Addressing Corporate
2017] 277
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Business people thrive on predictability as they manage their en-
terprise risks, but the Trump Administration has been anything but pre-
dictable, and as of the time of this writing, shows no signs of settling
down. This Essay will thus outline how general counsel, boards, compli-
ance officers, and institutional investors should think about risk during
an increasingly volatile administration. Specifically, I will discuss key cor-
porate governance, compliance, and social responsibility issues facing
U.S. public companies, although some of the remarks will also apply to
the smaller companies that serve as their vendors, suppliers, and custom-
ers. Tennessee, which has more citizens working for foreign employers
than any other U.S. state,10 several corporate headquarters, and a bur-
geoning startup community, serves as a microcosm of U.S. economy.
In Part I, I will discuss the importance of enterprise risk man-
agement ("ERM") in general and some of the prevailing standards that
govern it. In Part II, I will focus on the changing role of counsel and
compliance officers as risk managers and will discuss recent surveys on
the key risk factors that companies face under any political administra-
don, but particularly under President Trump. Part III will outline some
of the substantive issues related to compliance, specifically the enforce-
ment priorities of various regulatory agencies. Part IV will discuss an is-
sue that may pose a dilemma for companies under Trump-
environmental issues, and specifically shareholder proposals and climate
change disclosures in light of the conflict between the current EPA's po-
sition regarding climate change, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Cli-
mate Accord, and corporate conunitments to sustainability. Part V will
conclude by posing questions and proposing recommendations using the
ERM framework and adopting a stakeholder rather than a shareholder
Irresponsibiky for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REv. 84, n.25
(2015); see also Ulrike Zeigerman, Responsibk Business Conduct Fm Good Intentions to Sus-
tainable Development, 3 COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 2 (May 2014),
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/Coherence%20for%20DevelopmentApril_2014.pdf (de-
fining CSR as entailing "conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally
recognised standards.").
'
0 Patricia Cohen, When Foe gn Companies Are Making Not Iblng U.S. Jobs, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/business/economy/chattanoo-
ga-foreign-investment.html?mcubz=1.
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maximization perspective. " I submit that companies that choose to pull
back on CSR or sustainability programs in response to the President's
purported pro-business agenda will actually hurt both shareholders and
stakeholders.
I. THE CHANGING FACE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
Corporate counsel have a number of sources for risk-
management related guidance including Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank,
fiduciary duties under Delaware law, and the New York Stock Exchange
Listing Standards. I will discuss each of these briefly below.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has required
companies to publicly disclose all material risks since the mid-1990s;"
however despite these disclosures, massive corporate scandals have
wiped out shareholder value and led to repeated recessions. Congress
passed Sarbanes-Oxleyl3 in 2002 after the public lost trust in financial
11 A detailed shareholder versus stakeholder maximization debate is beyond the scope
of this paper. For excellent articles on the subject see general# William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Pnmag's Corporatist Ongins: Ado/f Berle and the Modern
Corporation, 34 J. CoRp. L. 99, 100 (2008) ("A continuing and longstanding debate has
been waged in corporate law scholarship among those who favor shareholder primacy,
those who favor management discretion, and those who believe that corporations have
a social responsibility to other constituencies, such as the corporation's employees, and
the wider public interest."); Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibiliy & Concession
Theog, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 1 (2014) (providing a history of the debate, discuss-
ing director primacy, team production, shareholder primacy, managerialism, and con-
cession theories and arguing, "anyone favoring mandatory corporate social responsibil-
ity should also support concession theory because it is the theory that most empowers
the state to mandate socially responsible behavior on the part of corporations." Id. at 4).
12 See Report of The Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes, SEC (1996), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm. Risk factor
disclosure on Forms 10-K and 10-Q have been in place since 2005. On October 11,
2017, the SEC proposed amendments to modernize and streamline disclosures, includ-
ing risk factors. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Implement FAST Act
Mandate to Modernize and Simplify Disclosure (Oct. 11, 2017) (available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-192). Among other things, the SEC
proposes allowing firms to focus on a principles-based approach of the risks tailored
for its investors.
'3 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2017] 279
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institutions and corporate America, but notwithstanding the additional
due diligence requirements and risk mitigation measures, the financial
markets collapsed again in 2008 in part due to excessive risk taking. Fol-
lowing the 2008 financial crisis, the New York Stock Exchange Commis-
sion on Governance performed a thorough review of the legal landscape
and outlined director duties as follows:
In assessing shareholder concerns and
demands, it is appropriate for directors to
consider whether any constituencies (or
their agents) have interests other than to
maximize the long-term, sustainable prof-
itability of the corporation.. . .The board
should also ensure that appropriate risk
management systems are in place so that
excessive risk taking is avoided."
Accordingly, companies listed on the NYSE must publicly disclose their
guidelines and policies regarding their (1) risk assessments and risk man-
agement, (2) major financial risks, and (3) the steps taken to monitor and
control the listed risks.' 5
In response to the public clamor for reform and accountability
after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed Dodd-Frank' 6 in 2010.
That law establishes additional protections for shareholders and inves-
1 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE), REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 26-27, (2010), http://
www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/nyse_cgreport 23sep2010 en.pdf.
Is See Section 303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements, NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL 5 303A.07(c)(iii)(D) (approved Aug. 22, 2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com
/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_14_3_6&manual=%/2Flcm%/o2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F.
16 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act includes, among other things, corporate governance
and executive compensation reforms, new rules for credit rating agencies, new registra-
tion requirements for hedge fund and private equity fund advisers, heightened regula-
tion of over-the-counter derivatives and asset-backed securities and significantly in-
creased oversight and regulation of banks and other financial institutions. It also in-
cludes the conflict minerals provision discussed earlier in this Chapter.
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tots. In 2010, the SEC also enacted new proxy disclosure requirements
requiring companies to describe the board's role in overseeing risk man-
agement, and the ways in which that oversight responsibility affects the
board's structure. 7 The SEC also published interpretative guidance re-
garding companies' obligations to disclose exposures and expenditures
related to climate change risks."
However, even before Dodd-Frank, boards had a clearly defined
role in overseeing risk under the Caremark case, which establishes a
board's duty to ensure that that there is a credible and functioning com-
pliance program. In the 1996 Caremark litigation, a Delaware court estab-
lished that corporate directors may face personal liability for failing to
adequately monitor employee-wrongdoers, and that in order to receive
the protection of the business judgment rule, they must "exercise a good
faith judgment that the corporation's information and reporting system is
in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate in-
formation will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of
ordinary operations so that it may satisfy its responsibility."" Although
the board does not implement or manage the compliance program, the
board must ensure that an effective, functioning compliance program
exists. Counsel and compliance officers play a critical role in assisting the
board in that task.
Boards must also focus on sustainability as a key risk because
both the United States and European Union ("EU") governments' seek
' See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(h) (2017). The SEC sought comments on Regulation S-K in
2016 as part of a disclosure effectiveness project. See Request for Comment on Subpart
400 of Regulation S-K Disclosure Requirements Relating to Management, Certain Secu-
rity Holders and Corporate Governance Matters, SEC, (2016), https://www.sec.gov
/rules/other/2016/33-10198.pdf.
18 Commission Guidance Regarding Climate Change, SEC (Feb.), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf; 17 C.F.R § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2017); 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.103 (2017).
19 In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (DeL Ch. 1996).
20 See Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uti=CELEX:32014LOO95&from=EN (amending
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Infor-
mation by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups).
2017] 281
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such non-financial disclosures. "Sustainability" is commonly defined as
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.""1 More
firms than ever now also speak and report in terms of the "triple bottom
line"-people, profit and planet--because the market either encour-
ages or requires them to do so." Further, researchers have proven that
"firms with good ratings on material sustainability issues significantly
outperform firms with poor ratings on these issues.""
Indeed, in 2016, the EU implemented non-financial disclosures
for any firm that conducts business in its borders, employs more than
500 people, and has a balance sheet total of at least USD$25 million or a
net turnover of approximately USD$50 million.2 5 Starting in 2018, these
companies must report annually on their policies related to: environmen-
tal protection; social responsibility and treatment of employees; respect
21 The definition likely comes from a seminal 1987 United Nations paper known as the
Brundtland Report, which cautions that "sustainable development is not a fixed state of
harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional
change are made consistent with future as well as present needs." See Gro Harlem
Brundtland, Our Common Future, UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV.
(WCED) ch. 2, introduction (1987), http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-
future.pdf.
2 Triple Bottom Line: It Consists of Three Ps: Profit, People and Plant, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17,
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14301663.
23 For examples, see Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Culture Sustainabiliy on
OrganiZational Processes and Peormance, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 17950, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/ wl7950.pdf. The paper compares 90
"high sustainability" companies that were early and voluntary adopters of environmen-
tal and social policies and which use these measures as governance practices, with 90
"low sustainability companies" or traditional companies, finding that over an 18-year
period, sustainable firms outperform traditional firms in terms of both stock market
and accounting performance.
24 Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainabity: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 THE AC-
COUNTING REv. 1697, abstract, Nov. 9, 2016, https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2575912.
2 See Katherine V. Smith, Sustainabity Reports Getting Attention from Investors and Rgula-
tors, Bos. C. CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:53:41 AM),
http://corporatecitizenship.bc.edu/sustainability-reports.
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for human rights; anti-corruption and bribery; and diversity on company
boards (in terms of age, gender, educational and professional back-
ground).'
Investors also increasingly seek information about sustainability
thus forcing companies that do not have to comply with U.S. or EU
governmental directives to report on environmental, social, and govern-
ance factors ("ESG") anyway." A 2017 Ernst & Young survey of insti-
tutional investors revealed that 80% of respondents believe that compa-
nies have failed to develop adequate, long-term strategies on environ-
mental and social issues even though such strategies are critical to sus-
tainable growth and have quantifiable impact over the long term."
Companies are hearing from these large investors and respond-
ing. As John Liu, who managed New York City's $152 billion pension
fund for four years, has observed, "there are reports and studies that
show that companies who pay attention to [ESG benchmarks] generally
have a better track record of long-term growth."29 Adding to the pres-
26 Non-Financial Reporting, EUROPEAN COMM'N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/ busi-
ness-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-
financial-reporting-en (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
27 Chris Park & Dinah A. Koehler, The Responsible Enterprise, in BUSINESS TRENDS 2013
38, 39 (Deloitte Univ. Press 2013), https://www2.deloitte.com/content
/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Finance/CFO/2013-SO-Business-
Trends-vFINAL.pdf. The authors recommend that firms integrate ESG and financial
reporting to build trust with customers, improve understanding of risk, and enable tar-
geted mitigation when things go wrong; also, observing that responsible enterprises
attract funding and enjoy a lower cost of capital. Id. at 41-42.
28 IS Your Nonfina#al Peformance Revealing the True Value of Your Business to Investors?,
ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LIMTED 3 (2017), http://www.ey.com/Publica-
tion/vwLUAssets/EY-_ NonfinanciaLperformance may-influencejinvestors/$FILE
/ey-nonfinancial-performance-may-influence-investors.pdf. The survey gathered re-
sponses from 320 decision-makers for institutional investors around the world, a third
of which have more than US$10b assets under management. Id. at 28.
29 Dan Morrison, US Companies Rank Miseraby Low on the UNs New Corporate Responsibil-
ity Rankings, QUARTZ (Apr. 19, 2017), https://qz.com/963033/us-companies-rank-
miserably-low-on-the-uns-new-corporate-responsibility-rankings/.
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sure, in 2016, the California Public Employees Retirement System"o be-
gan asking corporations it invests in to seat climate change experts on
their boards."
The regulatory system also requires firms to consider the triple
bottom line through the shareholder proposal process under Rule 14a-8,
which allows certain shareholders to submit a proposal to be included in
the company's annual report for a shareholder vote in proxy statements
at the annual meeting." Often these include ESG matters. In fact, of the
827 proposals filed in 2017, 201 concerned social issues filed mostly by
pension funds and socially responsible investors." As of the end of 2015,
1 in 5 dollars, or 8.72 trillion dollars, was invested according to socially
responsible investing principles."
Finally, influential proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder
Services ("ISS") bases its 2017 guidelines on the following governing
principles:
[S]ocially responsible investors have dual
objectives: financial and social. Socially re-
sponsible investors invest for economic
gain, as do all investors, but they also re-
quire that the companies in which they in-
o The California Public Employees Retirement System's current value as of July 31,
2017, is $345.26 billion dollars. CaIPERS Investment Fund Values, CALPERS, https://
www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/asset-classes/asset-allocation-performance/in-
vestment-fund-values (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
31 Liz Farmer, Pension Fund Takes Unprecedented Chmate Change Action, GOVERNING (Mar.
17, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-climate-change-pension-
calpers.html.
32 Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, SEC (2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/ le-
gal/cfslbl4.htm.
33 Ronald 0. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Pposal Developments During the 2017
Prxy Season, HARV. L. ScH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments-du-
ring-the-2017-proxy-season.
3 See SRI Basics, US SIF: THE F. FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV.,
http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
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vest conduct their business in a socially
and environmentally responsible manner....
Generally, we take as our frame of refer-
ence policies that have been developed by
groups such as the Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility, the General
Board of Pension and Health Benefits of
the United Methodist Church, Domini So-
cial Investments, and other leading church
shareholders and socially responsible mu-
tual fund companies. Additionally, we in-
corporate the active ownership and in-
vestment philosophies of leading globally
recognized initiatives such as the United
Nations Environment Programme Finance
Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations
Principles for Responsible Investment
(UNPRI), the United Nations Global
Compact, and environmental and social
European Union Directives.
Board members and company executives must therefore consider
these factors due to the influence that ISS, other proxy advisory firms,
and socially responsible investors such as pension funds have on the in-
vesting public. 3 Although the Trump Administration's stated priorities
regarding certain social issues may lead a board to consider cutting back
on funding CSR or sustainability initiatives, that short-term thinking may
have long term consequences for the bottom line and investor relations.
United States SRI Proy Voting Guideknes: 2017 Poli Recommendations, INSTrrUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERV. 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy
/2017-sri-us-voting-guidelines.pdf.
36 See Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Pm.yAdisoU Firms: Euidence from a Regrs-
sion-Discontinuy Design, Forbes Vol. 29, No. 12, (Dec. 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/christopherskroupa/2017/06/26/proxy-advisors-their-ise-their-value/#30f26ecf
6e10.
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II. LAWYERS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICERS AS GATEKEEPERS
Lawyers and compliance officers must ensure corporate compli-
ance with Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, the New York Stock Exchange
Listing Rules, and the directives discussed in Part I, but they should also
play a pivotal role in developing, implementing, and sustaining an ERM
program tailored to both their industry and company.
Prudent firms conduct ERM assessments, and rating agencies
and investors expect them to do so because they view ERM "as a leading
indicator of a firm's ability to operate within a controlled risk/reward
framework." " ERM extends to strategic, operations, reporting, and
compliance risks as outlined by the Committee of Sponsoring Organiza-
tions ("COSO"), the standard-bearer for ERM." COSO defines ERM as
a "process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and
other personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and man-
age risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.""
COSO encourages boards to focus on: (1) what the firm is will-
ing to accept as it pursues shareholder value; (2) a knowledge of man-
agement's risk management processes that have identified and assessed
the most significant enterprise-wide risks; (3) a review of the risk portfo-
lio compared to the risk appetite; and (4) whether management is proper-
ly responding to the most significant risks and apprising the board of
37 Mark Murray, Rating Agencies Are Positive on ERM Why Insurers Need to Pay Attention,
WILLIs TOwERs WATSON (Sept. 2013), https://www.towerswatson.com/enUS
/Insights/Newsletters/Global/emphasis/2013/ating-agencies-are-positive-on-erm
(explaining ERM's increasing influence on ratings and regulations and determining that
the methodologies employed by rating agencies and the reporting requirements set by
regulators have become more prospective in nature).
38 See COMMTTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION
(COSO), THOUGHT LEADERSHIP IN ERM DEMYSTIFYING SUSTAINABiLITY RISK 3
(MAY 2013) [hereinafter COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT]; See also COSO Ex-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT - INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, 3
(2004) [hereinafter COSO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]
39 COSO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 38, at 2.
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those risks.4 Firms must also carefully consider the external environ-
ment, since the achievement of the strategic and operations objective is
often due to events outside of the entity's control.4 1 The political land-
scape under President Trump serves as but one example. Further, audi-
tors and accounting firms must now advise companies to quantify non-
financial risks and to prioritize them based on materiality as it relates to
the company's operational and financial performance.4 2
Rating agencies pay attention to firms' ERM efforts as well.
Standard and Poor's ("S&P") considers: how the organization has estab-
lished risk tolerances and how these tolerances are applied to the overall
strategic decision-making process; risk-control processes for each firm;
and how the firm manages emerging risks.43 S&P also analyzes earning
loss, enterprise value, and other financial metrics for various risks."
ERM in the past was relegated to financial and audit personnel,
but lawyers now play an increasingly important role as gatekeepers-a
role academics have talked about for years.4 ' Among other things, the
lawyer/gatekeeper protects the public and the shareholders from malfea-
sance or excessive risk taking by management and the board.
40 Id., at 1.
41 Id., at 3; COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, sfpra note 38, at 4.
42See Marcy Murninghan, Redefining Materiality II: Why It Matters, Who's Involved,
and What It Means for Corporate Leaders and Boards 4, (Ted Grant ed., 2013).
43See generaly SRIDHAR MANYEM, S&P's ERM FRAMEWORK (2015), http://www.ulti-
risk.com/pdf/ultimate-risk-may-2015-sridahr-presentation.pdf.
44Id. at 16.
45 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 192 (Oxford 2008) (focusing on the role of corporate counsel
on reviewing due diligence and corporate transactions); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney
As Gatekeeper An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1297 (2003)
("[Glatekeepers are independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they with-
hold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some
transaction or to maintain some desired status."); Peter J. Henning, The New Corporate
Gatekeeper, 62 WAYNE L. REv. 29,29-30 (2016).
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This risk-mitigation role has never been more important because
of the myriad of compliance and CSR issues facing corporations and the
potential for deregulation, as promised by President Trump. Thus, it may
be a good thing that by 2020, 31% of New York Stock Exchange-traded
companies expect to add a chief risk officer role to their general coun-
sel's responsibilities and 25% will add a Chief Government Relations Of-
ficer.' These responsibilities will add to the corporate secretary and chief
compliance officer titles that many general counsels already hold but will
ultimately serve both shareholders and stakeholders of companies that
may engage in more risk in an era of volatility and deregulation."7
The pioneer of the in-house counsel revolution, Ben Heineman,
Jr., explains the modern-day inside lawyer's role this way:
Without question, the most basic job of the
General Counsel is to determine what is the law
and to help shape messages, systems, and process-
es so that the corporation adheres to law and
avoids legal haZard all across the globe . . . .
Compliance avoids harm to the corporation, but
it also creates value inside the corporation, in the
marketplace, and in broader society by underscor-
ing the corporation's commitment to integrity and
differentiating itfrom less scrupulous rivals."
It is not surprising then, that when 1,100 chief legal officers were sur-
veyed about what issues "keep [them] up at night" in the two months
prior to the 2016 election, 74% cited ethics and compliance and 71%
cited regulatory or governmental changes. Twenty-eight percent of re-
46 General Counsel Pay Trends 2016, EQUILAR 7 (Nov. 2016), http://www.barkergilmore
.com/hubfs/Dos/EquilarGCPayTrends_2016_Report.pdf?t=1480526974922.
47 Id
# BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 131 (2016) (emphasis in original).
49ACC Chief Legal Oficers 2017 Survey, Ass'N OF CORP. COUNS. 1, 4 (2017),
https://www.acc.com/vl/public/Surveys/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&page
id=1449472&page=/legalresources/resource.cfm&qstring=show= 1449472&fromLibra
ry=1&title=ACC%20Chief/o2OLegal%200fficers%202017%20Survey%20%20Executi
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spondents have been targeted by a regulator in the past two years."
Board members in a September 2016 survey also expressed concern
about regulatory changes and scrutiny as a top risk." These pre-election
survey results make sense because at the time the surveys were answered,
most people expected a democrat to win, and that could have theoreti-
cally led to more stringent regulations on business.
This regulatory uncertainty should, diminish under a Republican
Congress and Republican President, particularly a President with an
avowed pro-business, deregulatory agenda. However, other than a com-
plex and controversial tax plan that strongly favors some business types
over others, no other major substantive legislation has passed in the first
twelve months of the Administration.
Moreover, President Trump's unexpected and often controver-
sial executive orders have actually increased regulatory uncertainty. In
fact, in a study of 10-Ks and 20-Fs filed between September 1, 2016 and
ve%20Summary&recorded=1. The Association of Corporate Counsel Chief Legal Of-
ficers 2017 Survey is the largest global study of the issues and challenges facing chief
legal officers in corporate legal departments.
s0 Id. at 4.
51 See N.C. State Poole College of Management, Executive Perspectives on Top Risks for
2017: Key Issues Being Discussed in the Boardroom and C-Suite, PROTIVI 7,
https://www.protiviti.com/sites/default/files/unitedstates/insights/nc-state-protiviti-
survey-2017-top-risks.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). North Carolina State University's
ERM Initiative and Protiviti surveyed 735 C-level executives, 55 percent of whom are
based in the United States. Id. at 2.
52The tax cuts went into effect on January 1, 2018 for businesses but as of the time of
this writing, it was too early to tell the effects of the cuts. Several commentators have
questioned whether the plan favors larger businesses over smaller business. See e.g., Joe
Ciolli, An Econ Professor Turned Small-Business Owner Breaks Down his 3 Big Problems with the
GOP Tax Plan, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2017, 6:03 AM) http://www.businessinsid-
er.com/small-business-effect-of-trump-gop-tax-bill-2017-12; Brittany De Lea, What
Tax Reform Really Means for Small Businesses, Fox Bus. (Dec. 28, 2017),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/12/28/what-tax-reform-really-means-
for-small-businesses.html; Andrew Soergel, GOP Tax Bill Rewards Real Estate, Oil Wile
Hurting Hospitals, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 1, 2018, (12:01 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2018-01-01/gop-tax-bill-rewards-
real-estate-oil-while-hurting-hospitals.
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April 30, 2017, approximately 600 companies disclosed Brexit-related
risk and almost as many-approximately 550---disclosed risk factors re-
lating to the Trump administration. These risk factors related to the
very issues that he campaigned on-tax reform, health care, trade, immi-
gration, and environmental concerns.
III. KEY CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND GOVERNANCE CONCERNS
In this Part, I will address key compliance risks that companies
face now, particularly under the Department of Labor ("DOL"), the De-
partment of Justice ("DOJ"), and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC").5 4 I have chosen these three agencies as examples because
they have jurisdiction over all public companies and, in some instances,
over those in their supply chains. For each agency, I will highlight a few
areas of interest to illustrate the potential risk areas that stem from un-
certainty. From a practical perspective, companies must determine
whether to increase or decrease compliance spending in light of the stat-
ed priorities. Decreasing compliance budgets and pulling back on policies
may lead to more risk in the long term, even if such actions comply with
the letter of the law under President Trump.
The DOL, which implements dozens of labor laws affecting ap-
plicants, workers, federal contractors, and retirees, has often been at
odds with the business community. Labor Secretary Acosta has only
provided some measure of relief for corporate America. In one "victory"
for employers, the DOL has pulled back on Obama-era changes to the
overtime rules, stating in a request for public comments that "[t]he De-
partment is aware of stakeholder concerns that the standard salary level
5 Michal Berkner et al., SEC Disclosure Trends Related to Brexit and the Trump Administra-
tion, SKADDEN (May 25, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications
/2017/05/sec-disclosure-trends-related-to-brexit.
54 Although over 65% of chief legal officers raised data breaches and information secu-
rity as top concerns, those topics are large and important enough to merit a separate
article, and thus I will not discuss them here even though they are or will likely be on
every board agenda in the country. See ACC Chief gal Oficers 2017 Surry, supra note
49, at 4. Board members listed those as top 10 concerns, as well. See Executive Perpectives
on Top Risks for 2017: Key Issues Being Discussed in the Boardroom & C-Suite, supra note 51, at
7.
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set in the 2016 Final Rule was too high. In particular, stakeholders have
expressed the concern that the new salary level inappropriately excludes
from exemption too many workers. . .""
Secretary Acosta at first did not satisfy business leaders or Presi-
dent Trump by delaying the implementation of the so-called fiduciary
rule, which raises the fiduciary standard of brokers to be the same as the
standard of Registered Investment Advisors." Many business leaders had
complained that the Obama-era rule was overbroad, capricious, paternal-
istic, and unnecessary, and, in June 2016, five lawsuits were filed against
the DOL." Providing some measure of hope to the business communi-
ty, in February 2017, President Trump signed an executive order requir-
ing a review of the rule explaining:
One of the priorities of my Administra-
tion is to empower Americans to make
their own financial decisions, to facilitate
their ability to save for retirement and
build the individual wealth necessary to
afford typical lifetime expenses, such as
buying a home and paying for college,
55 See Request for Information; Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 82 Fed. Reg.
34616 (proposed July 26, 2017) (pending comments), https://www.federalregister.gov
/documents/2017/07/26/2017-15666/request-for-information-defining-and-
delimiting-the-exemptions-for-executive-administrative.
s6See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Invest-
ment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibited Transaction Exemption
2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between In-
vestment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (Prohibited Trans-
action Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-
1, 84-24 & 86-128, 82 Fed. Reg. 16902 (proposed Apr. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2510), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/07/2017-
06914/ definition-of-the-term-fiduciary-conflict-of-interest-rule-retirement-investment-
advice-best; see also John Hilton, Trump's DOL Backs Fiduday Rule in Legal Brief INSUR-
ANCENNEWSNET.COM (July 5, 2017), https://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/
trumps-dol-backs-fiduciary-rule-legal-brief#.WeUYWxNSzFQ.
57 See Jacklyn Wille, Labor Department Faces Five Lawsuits Over Fiduday Rule, BLOOMBERG
BNA (June 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/labo-department-faces-n57982073912/.
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and to withstand unexpected financial
emergencies. . . . [The Fiduciary Rule]
may significantly alter the manner in
which Americans can receive financial
advice, and may not be consistent with
the policies of my Administration.5 8
However, surprising many observers, just a few months later,
Secretary Acosta filed a brief responding to the litigation. He explained:
[The] DOL reasonably determined, on
the basis of the extensive record before it,
that conflicted transactions involving cer-
tain annuities should be required to satisfy
the BIC Exemption .... DOL concluded
that the exemption's conditions are nec-
essary to protect retirement investors
from the harms posed by conflicted
transactions involving these complicated
products."
At the end of November, Secretary Acosta reversed position on the de-
lay of implementation and now enforcement will not occur until the
middle of 2019, leading some to believe that the rule may never go into
effect.' This means that while the review is pending, firms must deter-
mine whether to develop systems and structures to comply with the rule.
The Trump Administration further confounded the business
community during oral argument in a Supreme Court case, heard in early
October 2017, which could have a significant impact on an estimated
58 Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. (Feb. 3, 2017)
(available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-
memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule).
9 See Hilton, supra note 56.
60 Mark Schoeff Jr., Delay of DOL Fiduciay Ruk Enforcement Mechanisms Now Final, In-
vestment News (Nov. 27, 2017, 2:04 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article
/20171127/FREE/171129942/delay-of-dol-fiduciary-rule-enforcement-mechanisms-
now-final.
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55% of employers and 25 million employees." The Court will opine on
the controversial use of class action waivers and mandatory arbitration in
the employment context. Specifically, the Court will decide whether
mandatory arbitration violates the National Labor Relations Act 62
("NLRB") or is permissible under the Federal Arbitration Act. 6 The
Trump administration reversed position and supported the employers
instead of the employees as the Obama Administration had done when
the cases were first filed. The current administration also argued in Court
against its own NLRB position that these agreements are invalid.64 Alt-
hough many business leaders were pleased with the change in position
that would allow mandatory arbitration of employment disputes, that
position is not consistent within the Trump Administration, as evidenced
by the Supreme Court oral argument. Accordingly, until the President
fills the slate of labor commissioners, companies cannot be sure of how
the NLRB will rule on key policies and cases.
Congress has also slashed the 2018 budget for both the DOL
and NLRB," and therefore key Obama-era proposals may never be final-
61 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cit. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
809 (Jan. 13, 2017); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013
(5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017).
62 See Frequenty Asked Questions, N.L.R.B., https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/ faq/nlrb
(last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
63 See Asa Lopatin, What Constitutes Arbitration for FederalArbitration Act Purposes?, A.B.A.
(June 16, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/itigation/committees/adr/articles
/spring20l4-0614-federal-arbitration-act.html.
6 For more information and to read the filed briefs, see National Labor Relations Board v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cas-
es/national-labor-relations-board-v-murphy-oil-usa-inc/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
65 U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., FY 2018 BUDGET IN BRIEF (2017), available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/FY2018BIB_0.pdf; Bourree Lam, The jobs
Programs Trump's Budget Would Cut, ATLANTIC (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/business/archive/2017/03/trump-budget-dol/519933/; Celine McNicholas &
Samantha Sanders, Polip Watch: Cuts to DOL Budget, Attacks on Joint Employer Standard,
ECON. POL'Y INST.: WORKING ECONS. BLOG (July 14, 2017), http://www.epi.org/
blog/policy-watch-cuts-to-dol-budget-attacks-on-joint-employer-standard/.
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ized and enforcement efforts will likely decrease due to lack of resources.
The potential under-enforcement may thus lead to higher risk taking in
labor and employment matters, and particularly in health and safety.
The DOJ under Jeff Sessions has also added uncertainty for cor-
porate America, particularly as it relates to corporate investigations and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing. Former Deputy Attorney General
Yates under President Obama had announced in September 2015 that if
companies wanted leniency credit during an investigation, they would
have to engage in an unprecedented level of cooperation, including
providing names and investigation reports about corporate insiders who
had committed wrongdoing. " The six elements outlined in what is
known as the "Yates Memo" are as follows: 1) cooperation credit is only
available if companies provide "all relevant facts"; 2) "criminal and civil
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from inception"; 3)
criminal and civil DOJ attorneys should communicate often and refer
cases; 4) there is no protection for individuals from liability in corporate
resolutions absent "extraordinary circumstances"; 5) the DOJ must have
a clear plan to resolve individual cases before statute of limitations runs
and declinations require approval; and 6) the government should not fo-
cus on an individual's ability to pay when looking at civil cases."
As many critics (including me) have pointed out, this policy inev-
itably leads to potential erosion of the attorney-client privilege and to
company executives seeking their own counsel, thus slowing down inves-
tigations." Although companies did not generally agree with this policy
statement, they have adapted to the new normal over the past two years.
Current Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced in Sep-
tember 2017 that the DOJ would likely change the parameters of the
6 Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Att'y Gen. Memo, 2 (Sept. 9,
2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/ download.
67 Id. at 2-3.
6 See e.g., Nathan Huff, One Year Later Yates Memo Remains a Threat to the Privileged Status
of Internal Investigations, A.B.A. WHiTE COLLAR CRIME COMMTTEE NEWSL., Win-
ter/Spring 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/crim-
inaljustice/2017/wcccn20l7 huff.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Yates Memo." Because there were no specifics regarding whether the
DOJ would abrogate or merely tweak the policy, corporate counsel and
compliance officers are now stuck in limbo.
Voluntary disclosures and corporate leniency programs figure
prominently in the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") as well. Both the DOJ and SEC share enforcement power,
and firms should assume that both agencies will continue vigorous en-
forcement. Attorney General Sessions made clear that:
[C]orruption harms free competition, dis-
torts prices, and often leads to substand-
ard products and services coming into
this country. It also increases the cost of
doing business, and hurts honest compa-
nies that don't pay these bribes.
[The DOJ] wants to create an even play-
ing field for law-abiding companies. [The
DOJ] will continue to strongly enforce
the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.
The Department of Justice will continue
to emphasize the importance of holding
individuals accountable for corporate
misconduct. It is not merely companies,
but specific individuals, who break the
law.70
69 Sarah N. Lynch, justice Department Mulk Changing Corporate Prosecution Polie, REUTERS
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-whitecollar/justice-
department-mulls-changing-corporate-prosecution-policy-idUSKCN1BP2KD.
70 See Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative An-
nual Conference (Apt. 24, 2017) (transcript available at Department of Justice
at https://www.jusice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-
remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-annual).
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In keeping with Sessions' comments, in early 2017, DOJ an-
nounced the extension of an Obama-era pilot program under which
companies that voluntarily self-report violations, cooperate with the gov-
ernment, and remediate a violation may receive reduced penalties, includ-
ing a declination of prosecution and disgorgement." In November 2017,
the DOJ announced a new, revised FCPA policy." Notably, Deputy AG
Rosenstein introduced the policy by announcing,
The new policy enables the Department
to efficiently identify and punish criminal
conduct, and it provides guidance and
greater certainty for companies struggling
with the question of whether to make
voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing
.... Establishing internal policies helps
guide our exercise of discretion and com-
bat the perception that prosecutors act in
an arbitrary manner. The new policy does
not provide a guarantee. We cannot elim-
inate all uncertainty. Preserving a meas-
ure of prosecutorial discretion is central
to ensuring the exercise of justice."
Critics have pointed out that this new, nonbinding policy fails to provide
a true compliance defense and provides guidance without clear reassur-
n Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just. Fraud Sect., The Fraud Section's Foreign Corrupt
Practices. Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download); Acting Att'y Gen.
Kenneth A. Blanco, Remarks at the A.B.A National Institute on White Collar Crime
(Mar. 10, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/ opa/speech/acting-
assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-blanco-speaks-american-bar-association-national).
72 United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-47.120 (2017), available at https://www.justice.
gov/usam/usam-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977.
73 Deputy General Rod J. Rosenstein, Remarks at the 34th International Conference on
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.
justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-in-
ternational-conference-foreign).
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ance because of the discretion allowed to prosecutors. 74 Significantly, this
policy does not protect individuals and thus executives, officers, and
board members could all face liability without the leniency offered to the
company that may turn their names over to the government as culpable
individuals.
SEC Chair Jay Clayton has indicated his support for rigorous en-
forcement of the FCPA as well, stating during his confirmation hearing
that he plans to work "with [his] fellow Commissioners, Enforcement
Division staff, and other authorities in the U.S. and abroad to coordinate
enforcement of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws."7 Companies
should therefore stay the course related to FCPA training, policy devel-
opment, and compliance initiatives particularly because other SEC staff
have reaffirmed the agency's commitment to enforcement.
Public companies must not only consider the enforcement priori-
ties of the DOL, NLRB, and DOJ, but they must also consider the SEC.
The year 2016 was a record year for the SEC with 868 enforcement ac-
tions of financial reporting misconduct, 160 cases against investment ad-
visers or investment companies, and 21 FCPA enforcement actions.7 7
Significantly, the SEC also touted its enforcement against gatekeepers,
including attorneys.
74 Statement on the DOJ's New "Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Polig" FCPA PROFES-
SOR (Nov. 29, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/statement-dojs-new-revised-fcpa-cor-
porate-enforcement-policy/#more-23708.
7 See Questions for the Nomination of Mr. Jqy Clayton to be a Member of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, from Ranking Member Sherrod Brown, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs 115th Cong. 9 (2017), available at http://src.bna.com/nBm.
76 Steven R. Peikin, Co-Director, Enforcement Division, Reflections on the Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of the SEC's Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
Speech at New York University School of Law (Nov. 9, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin-2017-11-09).
77 Press Release, S.E.C., SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2016 1 (Oct. 11,
2016) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html).
7 Id. at 3.
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While former SEC Chair Mary Jo White used a "broken windows
approach," enforcing minor violations to promote less risk taking and
more compliance," the SEC under Chair Clayton will likely employ a
different strategy. In a July 2017 speech laying out his priorities, he made
it clear that he would focus on "Main Street investors" and stemming the
50% decline in listed companies by requiring more reasonable, material
disclosures." Among other things, the agency will now focus on: en-
forcement actions related to cybersecurity; improving disclosure for in-
vestors, including through the now partially-enacted Fiduciary Rule de-
scribed above; and "toot[ing] out fraud and shady practices in the mar-
kets, particularly in areas where Main Street investors are most ex-
posed."81
In this section, I have discussed only a fraction of compliance,
governance, and CSR issues that counsel, management, and boards must
consider in the Trump era. Some firms, regardless of size or whether
they are publicly traded, must keep track of hundreds of regulations
promulgated by dozens of agencies at home and abroad. Companies in
their supply chains must also focus on this ever-changing regulatory
landscape, particularly in the age of disclosure. Although there is likely to
be less regulation, and, in some cases, deregulation in the Trump era,"
79Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9,
2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch100913mjw); Ed
Beeson, SEC Enforcement Chief Says 'Broken Windows'is Working, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/715013/sec-enforcement-chief-says-brokenwindows
-is-working.
8 Jay Clayton, S.E.C. Chairman, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (July 12,
2017) (transcript available at SEC at https://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/remarks-
economic-dub-new-york).
81 Id.
82 President Trump touted his record of rolling back regulations in a December 14,
2017 speech. Justin Sink & Alan Levin, Trump Boasts of Bringing a "Smeching" Halt to
Growth Regulations, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 14, 2017, 2:53 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-14/trump-boasts-of-screeching-
halt-to-growth-of-u-s-regulations. His Administration released a regulatory plan as well.
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, REGINFO, https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaMain (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). Some of the rollbacks that the Ad-
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that does not necessarily make counsel's job easier when shareholders
and stakeholders, including employees and customers, play such an im-
portant role in corporate success.
IV. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE IN THE
TRUMP ERA?
Public perception of companies matters. According to a recent
study, 63% of Americans want businesses that will take the lead to drive
social and environmental change moving forward, in the absence of gov-
ernment regulation; 78% want companies to address social justice issues;
87% will be more likely to purchase a product because a company advo-
cated for an issue they cared about; and 76% state that they will "refuse
to purchase a company's products or services upon learning it supported
an issue contrary to [their] beliefs."" Perhaps responding to this socially
conscious customer, CEOs have publicly criticized the President's poli-
cies and actions, even if they don't name the President himself. They
have issued statements, either as individuals or for their companies, on
wide ranging topics such as the travel ban, climate change, transgender
rights, diversity, immigration, racial violence in Charlottesville, Virginia,
and gun control.84
Notwithstanding public support for socially responsible compa-
nies, firms with strong CSR commitments may perceive a conflict be-
tween shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder norms. For ex-
ministration takes credit for had already died under President Obama.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/ 2017-12-11 /trump-takes-credit-for-
killing-hundreds-of-regulations-that-were-already-dead
83 2017 Cone Communications CSR Stuy, CONE COMMUNICATIONs, http://www.
conecomm.com/2017-cone-communications-csr-study-pdf (last visited Nov. 25 2017).
1 have argued that people do not always practice what they preach when it comes to
actually purchasing products or boycotting companies. Marcia Narine Weldon, Disdosing
Disclosure's Defects:Addessing Corporate Irmsponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 84, 136-38 (2015). However, these statistics about consumer pref-
erences are still important as companies try to build and maintain their brands.
84 Leslie Gaines-Ross, What CEO Actiism Looks Like in the Trump Era, HARv. Bus. REv.
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/what-ceo-activism-looks-like-in-the-trump-
era.
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ample, the Trump Administration has announced a rollback of a number
of Obama-era environmental rules and has disbanded a number of scien-
tific advisory committees." In June 2017, the President pulled out of the
Paris Climate Accord (the "Accord"), an agreement that almost 200 na-
tions had pledged to support." As the President explained,
[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the
latest example of Washington entering
into an agreement that disadvantages the
United States to the exclusive benefit of
other countries, leaving American work-
ers -- who I love -- and taxpayers to ab-
sorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower
wages, shuttered factories, and vastly di-
minished economic production.87
In what some consider one of the biggest rollbacks, on October
10, 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") proposed a
repeal of the Clean Power Plan ("CPP"), the centerpiece of President
Obama's climate change plan stating, "[r]epealing [CPP] will also facili-
tate the development of U.S. energy resources and reduce unnecessary
85 Michael Greshko et al., A RunningList of How Trump Is Changing the Enmament, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 2017/03/how-
trump-is-changing-science-environment/. See generally Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer,
E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html.
86 Press Release, President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris
Climate Accord (une 1, 2017) (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-
office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord); Mike James, 195
Countries Signed Paris Cmate Agreement, 2 Oppose it. For Now. (May 31, 2017, 6:28 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/05/31/only-two-nations-out-
197-oppose-climate-pact---and-us-may-next/102360164/; United Nations Climate
Change, Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/paris-agreement
/items/9444.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).
87 Id.
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regulatory burdens associated with the development of those resources..
"888
The Trump Administration's complete reversal from the Obama
Administration's policies on climate change and the environment" poses
a dilemma for companies that have already publicly committed to mini-
mizing their environmental impacts. Prior to the President's withdrawal
from the Accord, some of the nation's largest companies publicly urged
him to remain in the Accord." Hundreds of CEOs and dozens of state
and local governments pledged to voluntarily comply with the Accord's
standards, notwithstanding the President's actions." Seventy-one percent
of Fortune 100 and forty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies
have already publicly indicated an intent to increase spending on renewa-
ble energy and sustainability initiatives." In 2015, more than 5,600 com-
panies--close to 60% of the market capitalization of the world's largest
stock exchanges--disclosed environmental data through the Carbon
8 8 Press Release, EPA, EPA Takes Another Step To Advance President Trump's Amer-
ica First Strategy, Proposes Repeal Of "Clean Power Plan" (Oct. 10, 2017) (available at
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-
america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal).
89 Jennifer Hansler, 5 Major Changes to US Envionmental Pod&y in 2017, CNN POLITICS
(Dec. 30, 2017, 8:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/ politics/environmental-
policy-moments-2017/index.html; Michael Grenshko, Laura Parker & Brian Clark
Howard, A Running List of How Trump is Changing the Envtironment, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-
science-environment/.
9o Businesses Urge President to Remain in Paris Agreement, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/intemational/business-support-paris-agreement
(last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
91 Seth Feigermen, Apple, Facebook, Google join Hundreds of Businesses in Support for Paris
Agreement, CNN TECH (June 5, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/05/technology
/business/businesses-paris-climate-agreement/index.html; Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry
Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States & Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-
climate-standards.html.
92 2016 Corporate Advanced Energy Commitments, ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. (Dec.
2016), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/F100F500.pdf?t=1508158577960.
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Disclosure Project ("CDP"), a UK-based nonprofit.93 Twenty percent of
the world's emissions of greenhouse gases are accounted for through the
CDP portal, and 827 investors representing $100 trillion USD access
company climate change data through CDP.'" "In 2016, 533 cities, [over]
100[ state governments, and thousands of companies voluntarily report-
ed their climate impacts through the CDP platform." 5
Investors have also demanded action. Companies faced 144 envi-
ronmental proposals in 2017, and 69 related to climate change.96 Alt-
hough most did not pass, one notable exception was ExxonMobil.
Shareholders of ExxonMobil-a company under investigation by a
number of state regulators for misleading the public on climate
change' 7 -have demanded an accounting of climate change risks. 98
Blackrock and Vanguard, two of the company's largest investors, led th'e
charge for disclosure."
How then should companies react in light of the Trump agenda
and his appointment of Scott Pruitt, who has sued the EPA over a dozen
times and who has, along with President Trump, questioned the scien-
tific consensus on climate change?"oo Should boards now reconsider how
9 About Js, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
94 Discosing as a Company, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/companies-disdoser (last vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2017).
95 Amberli Young, Transpareng is a Ky Ingreaient for City Climate Action, INST. FOR MKT.
TRANSFORMATION (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.imt.org/news/the-current /transpar-
ency-is-a-key-ingredient-to-city-climate-action.
96 Mueller & Ising, supra note 33.
97 Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobits Climate Change Communica-
tions (1977-2014), ENVIRON. REs. LEfT. 12 (Aug. 23, 2017), http://iop-
science.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa8l5f.
98 Diane Cardwell, ExxonMobil Shareholders Demand Accounting of Clmate Change Poliy
Risks, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/business
/energy-environment/exxon-shareholders-climate-change.html.
" Id.
100 Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Cimate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-
global-warming.html; Dominique Mosbergen, Scott Pruitt Has Sued the Enwinmental Pro-
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to allocate shareholder resources away from climate change and envi-
ronmental initiatives by perhaps investing in new products, increasing
dividends, or buying back shares?
I argue that boards of socially responsible companies should not
reverse course under the Trump Administration. Instead, boards and
executives should serve both shareholder and stakeholder interests by
staying the course even when legislative changes related to the environ-
ment, social issues, and corporate governance may allow firms to relax
standards or eliminate programs. At a minimum, firms impacted by cli-
mate change regulation should disclose the potential impact of these pol-
icies and potential regulator changes to their shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
In Part II, I laid out the COSO ERM framework, and I will close
this Essay with ERM questions and concerns that compliance officers,
boards, management, and shareholders should consider when managing
and mitigating tisk in the Trump/Pence era.
1) What is the firm willing to accept as it pursues share-
holder value? To answer this question, firms must answer
(and possibly reconsider): a) what is shareholder value, b)
who are the shareholders, and c) what do they want? In many
companies, institutional investors now own most of the
shares. They drive the shareholder proposals, and they have
the ear of the company's investor relations department and
executive management. The "Main Street investor" that SEC
Chair Clayton wants to protect mainly invests through mutu-
al funds (an institutional investor). These institutional inves-
tors now expect more, not less information about ESG fac-
tors and how they affect the business and the larger commu-
nity. The ExxonMobil vote on climate change was initiated
by powerhouse investors Blackrock and Vanguard, not an
environmental non-governmental organization. Taking ad-
tection Ageny 13 Times. Now He Wants to Lead It, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/scott-pruitt-environmental-protection-
agency us_5878ad15e4b0b3c7a7b0c29c.
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vantage of the new regulatory landscape by reducing expendi-
tures on ESG initiatives and compliance programs may only
provide "value" to short-term investors. Further, it will in-
crease the risk-taking behavior that led to Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank. In other words, short term risk taking un-
der a less stringent regulatory regime may in fact lead to an
increase in regulation during a future administration.
2) What are management's risk management processes
that have identified and assessed the most significant
enterprise-wide risks? As stated earlier, the coun-
sel/gafekeeper role will and should increase in importance.
Even those counsel who do not add a "risk officer" title to
their names must keep Ben Heineman's words in mind: in-
house counsel are responsible for helping to shape the sys-
tems and processes so that the companies can avoid legal
hazards. This means that counsel and compliance officers
must hone new skills that help them proactively assess risk in
areas of regulatory scrutiny that may increase such as cyber-
security.
3) Review the risk portfolio compared to the risk appetite.
If companies face less regulation or even deregulation, risk
appetite may go up. If the firm no longer has to worry about
compliance and audits by certain regulatory agencies, some
managers and employees may choose to relax or ignore rules,
or more likely, cut back on funding for training and internal
monitoring. This will inevitably change the compliance and
ethics culture. This could, in turn, to lead to more whistle-
blowers or failure to report wrongdoing. Counsel, therefore,
should work with operations and management to re-evaluate
the risk profile considering current and pending legislation, as
well as potential stakeholder reaction. For example, a compa-
ny may suffer higher turnover rates and disengagement from
employee and stakeholders if it chooses to relax its safety
program to comply with the bare minimum required by law
under the Trump Administration. A review of the risk appe-
tite also includes a discussion of whether the company is will-
ing to risk voluntary disclosure of a compliance failure to re-
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ceive cooperation credit from the government, even at the
expense of criminal charges being levied against executives
and/or board members.
4) Whether management is properly responding to the
most significant risks and apprising the board of those
risks. The counsel/gatekeeper must help develop and assess
the portfolio of risks, understand the risk appetite, recalibrate
if necessary, and ensure that management and the board is
aware of the risks, including the risk of regulatory uncertain-
ty, particularly in light of the board's Caremark obligations. To
properly apprise the board, counsel must work in a more in-
terdisciplinary way with the IT, human resources, internal
audit, health and safety, and marketing departments to assess
risk cross-functionally, rather than working in silos as hap-
pens in so many organizations.
In sum, counsel must expand beyond merely knowing the law.
They must graduate from being risk-adverse to being risk intelligent by
reevaluating their company's vulnerability, and balancing that vulnerabil-
ity in the context of financial, regulatory, reputational, and legal risk in a
volatile political climate."' This risk intelligence must include a discus-
sion with the board and executive management regarding the changing
demands of the consumer market and the investor community particu-
larly on ESG matters, notwithstanding clear signals from President
Trump that the Administration will minimize regulatory scrutiny. The
new environment may also require additional transparency in public fil-
ings and with government regulators as uncertainty increases. Finally,
counsel and compliance officers as gatekeepers must redouble efforts to
strengthen ethical culture and ensure that the company's compensation
and other incentives structures promote the appropriate level of risk tak-
ing at all levels in the organization.
101 See The Risk Intellgent Gen. Counsek Discard the Compass and Get a GPS, DELOITTE 5,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-
Risk-Compliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligentgeneralcounseldiscardthecompassandgetgps.pdf
(last viewed Nov. 25, 2017).
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